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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
FALL-WINTER, 1970

PROPORTIONING COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE-PROBLEMS OF THEORY
AND SPECIAL VERDICT FORMULATION
RAY

J. AaicN*

Whatever proves to be the eventual denouement of the current
wave of wholesale attacks on the fault principle as the keystone of tort
liability, it is now plainly apparent that many jurisdictions will move
inexorably toward more sophisticated distinctions of degrees of fault
than conventional tort law has previously recognized. There has been
a current resurgence of interest in various comparative negligence systems, primarily as a substitute for the all-or-nothing approach of the
traditional contributory negligence doctrine, but of incidental interest
in buffering the ill-defined "strictness" of new doctrines of product liability and other "risk allocation" concepts. At the same time, the conventional refusal to permit "wrongdoers in pari delicto" to recover
contribution from one another has begun to yield to more sophisticated
notions of "equitable" contribution, involving one or another conception of cooperative or "comparative" fault.1
Without any necessary intention to commend or condemn these
trends, there is a serious need for some objective analysis of the theoretical and practical problems involved in them. A close study of Wisconsin's experience with its comparative negligence and comparative
contribution doctrines, and their procedural implementations, yields a
rich lode of provocative questions and answers, particularly significant
to the general bar because Wisconsin's comparative negligence formula
appears, on broad consensus, to be favored over the small group of
other systems with which there has been any amount of legal and practical experience. On August 12, 1969, the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association adopted the report of its Special Committee
on Automobile Reparations, recommending that the various states adopt
a Wisconsin type of comparative negligence supported by a special
2
'verdict procedure.
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; Legal Counsel, Mar-

quette University; Editor, Personal Injury Commentator; Member, Wisconsin
and American Bar Associations.
'See, for a recent example, Moyses v. Spartan Asphalt Paving Co., 383 Mich.
314, 174 N.W.2d 797 (1970).
2 A.B.A. Special Committee on Automobile Reparations 77, Jan. 27, 1969.
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SOME PREFATORY CONVICTIONS

It may be well to preface an analysis such as this with a few basic
observations which may help to identify the jurisprudential point of
view from which it proceeds. First of all, the matter cannot be approached objectively from a plaintiff-oriented, defendant-oriented, or
insurance-oriented standpoint, because there will inevitably be a whole
welter of offsetting benefits and detriment to each of those interestgroups, concentration on which will only serve to obscure and confuse
the real issues. The only interest appropriate for concentrated attention
is the broad interest of the bench and bar in improving the fairness and
efficiency with which the tort system operates.
Second, there is nothing to be gained by limiting the study either
to purely theoretical or purely procedural or practical considerations.
Flawed theory inevitably erupts in unworkable and wasteful practice
and procedure; and even the most perfect of theoretical solutions to a
problem is sterile and useless if it is not accompanied by procedural
and practical implementation of at least adequate quality. Nevertheless,
it is impossible to analyze an integrated question without separating its
theoretical from its practical parts, recognizing, in doing so, that no
broad conclusions may be drawn until those essentials are reunited in a
single context.
DEGREES OF FAULT-THE CONCEPT ITSELF

On these foundations, we may proceed to examine the theoretical
concept of "degrees of fault." Immediately, we encounter an anomaly,
with which we will be required to struggle throughout our study.
"Fault" is not a finite object. It is, rather, an evaluative judgment about
the quality of conduct or performance. As such, it is not a judgment
which proceeds out of sensory observation or measurement in the same
direct sense that quantitative evaluations or conclusions do. A judgment of fault, in other words, is only mediately supported by objective
evidence; immediately and directly, it is a subjective legal or ethical
pronouncement of responsibility for wrongdoing.
It is therefore inevitable that every such judgment will be heavily
colored by the personal ethical code, and by the conscious and unconscious moral prejudices and rationalizations, of the individual who
makes it. The ethically overscrupulous person will find fault in circumstances in which the libertine will find none; and, in circumstances
where both will concede that fault is present, the overscrupulous
judge or juror will recognize gross fault where the liberal will find
relatively slight wrongdoing.
It is out of a candid recognition of the essential subjectivity of these
judgments that "the rule of law" attempts, by book and by instruction,
to superimpose its own standards and definitions on subjective conceptions of fault and nonfault, and solemnly charges its judges and jurors
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to adopt and apply those standards and definitions in the process of
litigation. In this vein, we devise careful legal definitions of such
concepts as "negligence" and "cause," identifying specific standards for
determining their presence or absence.
If, for lack of any alternative, we are compelled to accept the somewhat naive notion that this process of superimposition really works to
unseat the studied or instinctive preconceptions of the individuals concerned, it is sheer fantasy to assume that subjective standards of evaluation will not continue to govern the matter where no rational or objective legal standard or definition is possible, or is even suggested.
Such is the case with respect to the concept of "degrees of causative
negligence.
This is not necessarily to exclude all logical possibility of declaring
"degrees" (or proportions, ratios, percentages, fractions, quotients, or
other measurements or comparisons) of fault. It is simply to suggest
that such measurements and comparisons, unlike their more familiar
physical counterparts, are ultimately judgments which have only one
legally defined reference point. Fault, like virtue or pregnancy, may be
confidently asserted, on stated facts, only to be either present or absent,
because once the legal or ethical judgment is made, it has consumed
its own definition.
Contrast physical measurements of all kinds, which are, by definition, inevitably relative, and can only be expressed, in comparative
terms, by employment of at least two reference points. Between the
subtle activity of a "stationary" vehicle and the blinding progress of
light, there are defined "degrees" of speed or movement, none of which
touches the absolutes of zero or infinity. Because finite objects do not
depend upon human judgment for their existence or for their physical
attributes, they are inherently capable of being scaled and measured
against the objective, sure, and consistent standards of the physical
and mathematical sciences.
In law, however, we find objective evidentiary support only for our
findings of what has happened, or of what was done or not done. But
the superimposed declaration, that the conduct so found is blameworthy
or blameless, is capable of accurate comparative evaluation only in the
sense that it can be declared, somewhat analogously, to be more or less
blameworthy than other blameworthy conduct (actual or hypothetical),
which may be adopted as an ad hoc standard for comparison. Qualitative thought, in short, is not inherently susceptible of supportable comparison except, at most, in terms of good-better-best or bad-worse-worst.
To assert a judgment that one instance of wrongdoing represents a
precise degree of mathematical "worseness," even as compared to
another, requires the presence- of a calibrated scale of "badness," which
simply does not exist in reality or in our conceptual framework.
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Nor do we help the matter significantly if we assert that what we
seek to measure is not degrees of negligence (or other wrong) but degrees of "cause," or contribution to a stated damage, injury, or accident.
This is true essentially because, as men of science (and especially
psychiatrists and psychologists) have repeatedly reminded the bench
and bar, it requires the simultaneous, interactive, and cooperative presence of a number of conditions to produce a given result. To suggest
the possibility of "weighing" the relative causal contribution of one
such condition, regarded in isolation from the others, is necessarily to
deny the essential interaction of causes without which the precise result
would not have occurred. Thus, while it is possible to state whether
or not a given condition or circumstance was a cause, or contributing
condition, of a given composite result, it is not possible to specify or
isolate the precise degree of its contribution to that result.
Especially is this true if we attempt to measure the causal contribution of an isolated factor against less than all of the causes involved in
producing the composite result under investigation. By that process, we
produce a relative numerical rating or "weight" which is not relative
to the result itself; but is, at best, valid only as a comparative evaluation
of the factors considered. Assume, for example, that factors a, b, and c
actually combine to produce a result, so that those factors, regardless
of their individual values, constitute 100 percent of the causes of that
result. If factor c is excluded arbitrarily from consideration, it is obvious that factors a and b must now be regarded, together, as constituting 100 percent of the causes of the same result, necessarily increasing
the percentage-value attributed to one or both of those factors. If factors
a, b, and c are assumed to have equal values, the arbitrary exclusion of
one of the factors increases the scale value of the remaining factors from
33 1/3 percent to 50 percent.
The problem reaches maximum intensity if the scale-values sought
to be assigned are themselves a composite of two distinct standards of
evaluation, as is true when we attempt to attach a single relative value
to the concept of "negligent cause." As suggested above, neither negligence nor cause, taken independently, is capable of any specific evaluation in numerical terms; and, while not all negligence is necessarily
causal with respect to a given damage or injury, neither are all causes
of the damage or injury necessarily negligent, or necessarily actionable
even if negligent (as in the case of immunities). Passing these questions, we lack any standard under which high degrees of negligence
can be integrated with low degrees of causation, or vice versa, so as to
produce a numerical composite of the two in either absolute or relative
terms.
Identical considerations apply to all processes of mathematical relationship or comparison, whether stated in terms of proportion, per-
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centage, ratio, fraction, or quotient-all of which are different expressions of the same basic process of comparing one thing with another.
All depend, for their validity, upon the accuracy with which one fixes
the objects to be compared upon a calibrated scale having some sort of
defined dimensions. We cannot validly allocate proportions, percentages,
ratios, fractions, or quotients to the concept, at least without a clear
acknowledgment that our allocations are subject to all of the potential
errors and approximations of every process of somewhat strained analogy. By the same token, such attempted dimensioning of qualitative
concepts must not be expected to yield results which will withstand
precise analysis or factoring in terms of consistent mathematical formulae. The analogical process may have a decent degree of validity and
consistency in some relatively simple and general applications, but fail
entirely to meet those standards in other, more complex or specific,
applications.
We therefore summarize this brief theoretical analysis of the concept of "degrees of fault" by concluding that such appraisals achieve
their greatest validity in cases in which they fall at or near the extremes,
or at or near the balance point, of whatever qualitative scale of values
we choose to apply. We can, in short, assert a judgment that a quality
is present or absent, or that it is more or less present in one case than
in another; but we lack any legal or conceptual scale upon which to
calibrate the relative ratios of its presence or absence as between two or
more cases; and, when the quality involved is actually a compound of
two or more qualities, we lack the means of proportioning the valences
of the several ingredients into a single conceptual compound.
These theoretical considerations have an obvious and profound, but
not necessarily decisive, effect upon the question whether we should
abandon the conventional contributory negligence doctrine in favor of
any alternative which is based upon a comparison of causative faults.
They may also supply several cogent reasons for preferring one comparative system over another.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE SYSTEMS COMPARED

It is probably a safe assertion that the theoretical anomalies above
suggested have been one principal deterrent to broad acceptance by
American jurisdictions of the comparative negligence principle in mit;
gation of the harshness (in theory, at least) of the traditional doctrine
of contributory negligence. A second deterrent, certainly no less troublesome, has been the difficulty of formulating and executing a workable
procedural format under which court and jury can function to implement a comparative rule objectively, justly, efficiently, and without
excessive disruption of the procedural patterns governing civil litigation
in general.
The principle of comparative negligence itself has always character-
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ized the civil tort law of the countries of Europe, and it has been rather
anciently and uniformly accepted as a basis of apportionment of damages in admiralty. In 1908, it became one of the governing concepts
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act 3 and, in various forms, it has
been accepted as a general tort principle in eleven jurisdictions of the
United States. 4
All of the systems of comparative negligence adhere to the basic
"fault" principle of Butterfield v. Forrester,5 in that they generally
penalize a damage claimant for his own negligent contribution to his
own damages. Whereas the Butterfield doctrine (abandoned in England under the Reform Act of 1945)6 blocked all recovery by a claimant
found to be contributorily negligent "in any degree," the various comparative negligence theories in current vogue foreclose a negligent
claimant entirely only (1) where his negligence exceeds a relatively
"slight" contribution to the causes of his injury, as compared to that
attributable to the party or parties claimed against; or (2) where his
negligence equals or exceeds the contribution of the party claimed
against; or (3) where his negligence is the entire cause of his own injury. Except under the "slight negligence" doctrine, the claimant's
full-compensation" damages are at least theoretically reduced, where he
is permitted to recover at all, in proportion to the degree of causal negligence attributed to him.
The "slight-gross" basis of comparison obtains by statute in South
Dakota7 and Nebraska.8 Somewhat surprisingly, it has apparently failed
to win broader acceptance because of its lack of numerical specificity,
which, in terms of our earlier theoretical analysis, should be its greatest
virtue. More probably, however, the general lack of enthusiasm for the
doctrine stems from a candid recognition that, in net practical effect, it
operates to very much the same conclusion as does the traditional strict
principle, as ameliorated by "last clear chance" considerations. To say
that a claimant was guilty of "slight" causal negligence, as compared
to that of the defendant, is not a significantly different appraisal from
one which exonerates the claimant entirely. The "slight-gross" doctrine
may avoid a few overtechnical directed verdicts, but is does not otherwise represent a very substantial departure from the principle of "all
or nothing."
Theoretically at the opposite end of the spectrum of comparative
negligence systems is the "pure" proportionate formula which character345 U.S.C. 53 (1908).
4Ghiardi and Hogan, Comparative Negligence, 9 Wis.
(1969).
511 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1907).
68-10 Geo. 6, c. 28.
7 S.D. CoMiP. LAWS § 20-9-2 (1967).
s N. Rav. STATS. § 25-1151 (1964).

CONT. LEGAL ED. 4
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izes the FELA,9 Merchant Marine Act, 0 and the general negligence
law of Mississippi. 1 This doctrine was lately espoused, either flatly or
by strong indication of judicial preference, by at least three of the seven
members of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.12 In terms of sheer theoretical elegance and symmetry, and accepting without too much cavil the
total validity of the process of mathematical proportioning as applied
to causal negligence, the doctrine is clearly the most appealing and "logical" of the three, and has garnered an impressive array of endorsements.' 3 Indeed, the principle of "pure" comparison has already been
incorporated, in a somewhat different and probably distinguishable
context, into the tort law of Wisconsin. Eight years ago, Bielski v.
Schulze'"4 abolished the long-standing principle of equal contribution
between joint tort-feasors in favor of "pure" comparative contribution.
Under that rule, joint tort-feasors are required to contribute to an adverse judgment, inter sese, in the literal and numerical ratio of their
respective negligent contributions to the damages of their victim.
The third principle, barring recovery only where the claimant's causal
negligence is equal to or greater than that of the party claimed against,
and reducing damages proportionately to the claimant's causal negligence in all other cases, governs negligence actions in Wisconsin, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, and Minnesota. 5 In
addition, New Hampshire has adopted a variant of the principle which
permits recovery where the claimant's negligence is no greater than that
of the party claimed against.'6
When one thinks in terms of reducing a verdict-damage award expressed in numerical dollar-values by the amount of a percentage, proportion, or ratio representing the claimant's own negligent contribution
to that damage, he instinctively assumes that the amount of reduction
must be calculated mathematically, and therefore in numerical terms.
Actually, of the nine states which purport in theory to reduce verdictdamages in this way, only Wisconsin and Arkansas have had any
amount of experience with a procedure which actually and consistently
required the isolation, in a special verdict finding, of the specific numerical factors which control either the gross damages or the causal negli9 45 U.S.C. 53 (1908).

1046 U.S.C.A. 688 (1920).
"1Miss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1942).
12 Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513 (1970).

13 See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Micn. L. REv. 465 (1953); Campbell, Wisconsin Law Governing Autoinobile Accidents, 1962 Wis. L. REV.
(1962) ; 47 Wis. 2d at 131, 177 N.W.2d at 518 (dissenting opinion).
14 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
15 WIs. STATS. § 895.045 (1967); ARK. STATs. ANN. §§ 27-1730.1 and 27-1730.2
(1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1956); HAWAII STATS. ANN. ch. 663
(1969); ME. Rrv. STATS. ANN. § 14,156 (Supp. 1968); MASS. Acrs § 761, 1
(1969) ; A Bill, Minn. H.F. No. 380 § 264, May 23, 1969.
16N.H. LAWS § 225.1 (1969). See, Nixon, The Actual "Legislative Intent" Behind New Hampshire's Comparative Negligence Statute, 12 N.H.B.J. 24
(1969).
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gence reduction ratio. Of these, Arkansas abandoned its requirement in
1957, after having encountered a series of frustrations with the procedure. 7 Similar views have been expressed with reference to New
Hampshire and Maine procedures.' 8
In the remaining states, including Mississippi, there is apparently no
general requirement and no general practice that the theory be translated faithfully, literally, or consistently into terms of specific numerical
apportionment. Instead, the whole magnificent doctrine, with all of its
appealing mathematical certitude, is, in terms of its visible and practical
execution, permitted to live or die on the basis of a routine jury instruction, saving the possibility that an occasional verdict may be set
aside as unsupported by credible evidence.
This is said as much in terms of praise as of criticism of the states
which temper their acceptance of a strictly mathematical approach to
comparative negligence by burying their processes of computation in the
jury room. Especially is that procedural evasion sensible in Mississippi,
where the relatively reliable estimate of whether one party's negligence
is greater or less than that of another is devoid of all legal significance,
and the total issue of liability in terms of the net judgment is declared
as the product of an estimated degree of damage times an estimated
degree of negligent contribution. If this nice theory were carried out
literally and openly in practical procedures, the compounded consequences of a variance of a few points of degree in one formula or the
other would make our present problems of retrial, proportioning, remittitur, and additur look like a kindergarten exercise by comparison.
More will be said of the comparative efficiencies of the several systems in the concluding parts of this paper, after we have performed a
closer analysis of the detailed workings of the Wisconsin system. The
present point is simply that, as extensions of the analogized mathematical
logic of comparative negligence become less and less defensible, prudence seems to require that we relax our emphasis upon spelling out
the mathematics by which the ultimate judgment must be supported.
Otherwise, for all of our sophistication of theory, we will inevitably
contradict and confuse juries, ourselves, and everyone else.
WISCONSIN JURY SUBMISSION PROCEDURE

The Wisconsin approach is more sharply distinguished by its procedural implementation than by its substantive provisions, which have
often been criticized as a largely unprincipled, "political" compromise.
Whatever is lost by substantive compromise is compensated, by comparison with other systems, by a far greater fidelity to legal theory in
17Leflar, Comparative Negligence: A Survey for Arkansas Lacwyers, 10 ARK.

L. REv. 54 (1955-56).

Matzke, Special Findings and Special Verdicts
L. REv. 523 (1956).

18 Nixon, note 16 supra. See also

in Nebraska, 35

NEB.
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actual legal practice. T he numbers, for whatever they are worth, are
actually revealed and used in determining the judgment.
The basic policy governing the functions of court and jury is sig-

nificantly less tolerant, in Wisconsin, of the jury's possible tendency
to interpret instructions according to their own lights, especially as such
instructions verge on the complex. In substantially all cases in which
either comparative negligence or comparative contribution is in issue,
the case is submitted on a special verdict of rather sophisticated design,
under which the jury is progressively required to return specific findings on each "ultimate fact" in issue which may be relevant to the judgment. In actions sounding in negligence (which, under Wisconsin doctrine, include actions involving strict products liability, strict safety
statues, safe place, and a broad group of property nuisances), the
typical verdict includes basic (and separate) negligence and cause questions relating to each party whose conduct may have contributed in any
substantial respect to any of the claims or cross-claims being litigated
in action; a question or questions (requiring specific numerical response) comparing the degrees of causal negligence attributable to each
party found to have contributed, by causal negligence, to a claimed
injury or damage; and a set of questions designed to fix dollar values
on the various items of injury or damage. By instruction, these dollar
values are required to represent full compensation values, undiminished
by any prior considerations of causal fault or comparisons of fault.
Ostensibly to preserve their objectivity, the Wisconsin jury may
not be informed, either by remark of counsel or by court instruction,
of the legal effect of their answers in terms of liability, nonliability, or
judgment.. 19 Unless they have acquired extrinsic information (which
they are charged not to take into consideration), they are unaware of
the fact that a finding of causal negligence against a plaintiff or other
claimant in a degree equaling or exceeding that found against the opposite party precludes recovery entirely; and they are similarly unaware
that the claimant's damage award will be reduced by the degree of
causal negligence attributed to him in any event.
Because of the emphasis which this system of jury submission places
upon the express isolation of a precise numerical proportion between the
causal negligences of the various parties, the Wisconsin procedure operates, when it works properly, to maximize the opportunity to test each
finding against its supportive evidence. But, because of the same high degree of exactitude with which the procedure discloses the jury's apportionment of causal negligence between the various participants, a long
series of problems has been encountered in determining the appropriate
verdict form for submission of the question, and in translating the ver19 DeGroot v. Van Akkeren, 225 Wis. 105, 273 N.W. 725 (1937) ; Blahnik v. Dax,
22 Wis. 2d 67, 125 N.W.2d 364 (1963).
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dict result into proper judgments. Those problems have not been entirely solved, even at this writing, nearly 40 years after the original enact20

ment.

THE TERMS OF THE

PROPORTION

Present Wisconsin Statute § 895.045 (renumbered from § 331.045
in 1965) provides, in substantially the same language employed in the
original enactment:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recover in an action by
any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property,
if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall
be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering.
In terms, the statute obviously requires a verdict which extrapolates
two essential and conceptually separate determinations:
(a) a determination, as between the causal contribution of each
claimant's own negligence to his own injury and the contribution thereto
of each negligent actor other than the claimant, whether the former was
less than the latter; and
(b) a determination of "the amount of negligence attributable to
[each] person recovering "with respect to his several elements of damages, in terms of the ratio, fraction, or proportion between that "amount"
and the "amount" contributed by all other actors to the same elements
of damage.
On the face of the matter, the two determinations are not identical,
and serve different statutory purposes. The first determination is needed
in order to ascertain that the claimant's negligence was "not as great as
the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought." 2' The
second determination is needed in order to settle the amount by which
the claimant's "damages allowed shall be diminished."
The point of significance, however, is that the first comparison operates simply between parts of a whole, determining whether one part is
equal to, or greater or less than, another. It is not significant to this
determination to fix precise ratios of difference. The second comparison
necessarily includes, and must be consistent with, the first; but the only
legally relevant factor to be isolated from the second comparison, specifically under the statute, is the proportion between the claimant's negligent contribution to his own damage and all other negligent contributions
to that damage. This proportion must be fixed precisely as to each
claimant, but need not be fixed, for statutory purposes, as to each other
person responsible for the claimant's damage.
20 Wis. Laws ch. 242 (1931).
21Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934);
Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Co., 14 Wis. 2d 601, 111 N.W.2d 495 (1961).
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However, Wisconsin's espousal of the doctrine of comparative contribution requires a precise fixing of the proportionate causal negligences
of parties claimed against in every case in which there are crossclaims for contribution between them, regardless of whether any contributory negligence of the plaintiff is involved. Because potential rights
to contribution between "joint tort-feasors" are very broadly in issue
under Wisconsin's liberal definition of "joint tort-feasors," it is now
generally necessary to fix precisely, for contribution purposes, the proportionate responsibilities of each party whose negligence may have
caused a given item of claim or damage.
In "simple" cases it will be obvious that one ratio can serve all three
purposes, without extravagant possibility of distortion. In this context,
a "simple" case is one in which the contributing actors and the causative factors relating to all asserted claims are fully identical. Most obviously, this case arises in either of two contexts: either where there
are only two litigating actors whose claims and counterclaims arise from
entirely identical causes, or where there is only one principal claim being
litigated.
COMPARING NEGLIGENCE IN MULTIPLE CLAIM CASES

The same simplicity is not necessarily present when more than one
claim is being litigated between more than two litigants, even though
the causative sources of the several claims are identical. Suppose, for
example, that a three-way collision occurs between vehicles driven by
A, B, and C, under circumstances in which those parties are the sole
causes of the collision, and the collision, in turn, is the sole cause of
the personal injuries and property losses of A, B, and C. Now suppose
that each claims against the other two for his damages, and each claims
against one of the others, alternatively, for contribution with respect
to a possible judgment in favor of the third. This "simple" case involves
nine distinct claims:
(1) A v. B and C for A's damages.
(2) B v. C and A for B's damages.
(3) C v. A and B for C's damages.
(4), (5) B v. C and C v. B for contribution if B and C are held
responsible for A's damages.
(6), (7) A v. C and C v. A for contribution if A and C are held
responsible for B's damages.
(8), (9) B v. A and A v. B for contribution if A and B are held
responsible for C's damages.
A verdict which establishes any stated proportionality between the
causal negligence of A, B, and C may establish that A was less negligent than B, and that B was less negligent than C, as, for example, a
finding of 10 percent (A), 30 percent (B) and 60 percent (C). Such
22

Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
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a verdict would dispose of all the claims concerned with A's damages
without difficulty. A's verdict damages would be reduced by 10 percent,
and B and C would contribute, as between themselves, 30/90ths and
60/90ths of the judgment.2 3 Further, since A has no liability for the
damages of either B or C, his causal negligence being less than theirs, the
claims by or against A for payment of and for contribution those damages would necessarily fail. By this reasoning, we have disposed entirely
of the claims above-numbered (1) and (4)- (9), and have reduced claims
(2) and (3) to simple two-party claims between B and C. Furthermore,
we have fixed a ratio of causal fault with respect to the B and C claims,
and as between B and C, at 30/90ths and 60/90ths respectively, so as to
make it apparent that C was more negligent than B, and consequently
that claim (3) must fail.
A slightly more subtle question is whether we have fixed, with respect to B's claim against C, the amount by which the claimant's "damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering." If the verdict-findings are
to be used at all, it is apparent that the appropriate "proportion" attributable to B must be 30 percent, since that was found to be the amount,
in terms of a percentage of a whole, by which B negligently caused the
collision and his own resultant injuries. 24 Moreover, since there is no
longer a problem of contribution between A and C, the fact that C must
bear 70 percent of B's damages on the basis of only 60 percent of the
causal fault has not, until the Vincent 2. case, been a matter of serious
legal or logical concern. Under the 50-50 contribution formula of the
Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-feasors Act,26 which gov-

erned Wisconsin practice in principle prior to the Bielski decision, a
tort-feasor only 1 percent causally negligent would have paid 50 percent
of the damages.
What is of some concern is the fact that the verdict-apportionment
of 30 percent to B is the result of the inclusion of a factor-A's 10
percent of causal negligence-which is legally irrelevant to B's claim
against C. Had the jury been asked simply to proportion the negligences
of B and C as causes of B's injury, it is evident, assuming consistency
of their appraisal, that the ratio would have been 1 to 2, producing a
reduction of B's damages by 33 1/3 percent instead of 30 percent.
Thus, while the verdict properly proportions the sources of B's damages
among all of the actual tortious actors, it does not confine its allocations
to the legally responsible parties.
The Wisconsin decisions have rather consistently adhered to the
23Id.
24See, Cameron v. Union Automobile Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 659, 246 N.W. 420
(1933), modifying Paluczak v. Jones, 209 Wis. 640, 245 N.W. 655 (1932).
25 Vincent v. Pabst Brewery Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513 (1970).
26 WIS. STATS. §§ 113.01-113.10 (1967).
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proposition that actual participation in the negligent causation of an
injury-not legal responsibility to compensate-is the criterion under
which the statutory proportion of the claimant's contribution to his own
injury should be determined.2 7 Indeed, the same proposition obtains
even though a participant in the transaction is not formally a litigant
in the case. In Ross v. Koberstein,28 Hardware Mutual Cas. Co. v.
Harry Crow & Son, Inc., 29 and Pattersonv. Edgerton Sand & Gravel
Co.,30 the trial court's failure to require the express inclusion of an
actual participant in the comparison question submitted to the jury
was determined to be an error, but one which did not operate to the
prejudice of a named defendant; although there was an implicit concession that the plaintiff was prejudiced thereby. The Patterson decision explained that:
If the jury had found that a certain percentage of that total
negligence was attributable to Finley (the omitted party), that
would have left a balance of less than one hundred percent attributable to Westcott (the appellant) and the plaintiff; and if the
jury had apportioned that balance between the latter two in the
same ratio in which it apportioned the one hundred percent between them (as the jury presumably would have done), then...
the deduction from the jury assessment of damages would have
to be a smaller percentage thereof than the fifteen percent deduction made under the verdict which was returned, and the
defendants would have been liable to the plaintiff for the full
amount of his consequently greater recovery. 31
In practical terms, it is highly unlikely that a jury would, in fact,
adhere to precisely the same ratio in allocating causal negligence between three parties as they adopted in allocating the same negligence
between two parties, although there is no disputing the likelihood
asserted in Patterson that a three-party allocation would presumably
operate to reduce the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff in
some degree. In cases involving narrower margins than the 15-85 ratio
considered in Patterson, however, the inclusion of a third participant
could operate so as radically to alter the legal result. Suppose, for example, a suit between A and B in which each was guilty of relatively
slight causal negligence, constituting together no more than 10 percent
of the total negligence causing A's injuries. On a 100 percent scale,
it is conceivable that the causal negligences of the two parties might be
apportioned as narrowly as 49 percent to 51 percent, A receiving the
lesser allocation. But if the negligence of participant C were included
in the proportion at 90 percent, it is not probable that a jury would
2
2

Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
220 Wis. 73, 264 N.W. 642 (1936).
29 6 Wis. 2d 396, 94 N.W.2d 577 (1959).
30 227 Wis. 11, 277 N.W. 636 (1938).
31Id. at 22, 277 N.W. at 640.
8
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return 4.9 percent against A and 5.1 percent against B, to complete
the 100 percent proportion. It is far more probable that the figures
would be rounded, either at 5 percent each, or at 4 percent to 6 percent,
3 percent to 7 percent, or some similar alternative.
This example demonstrates two things. First, it shows how a verdict which fails to proportion negligences among all participants-even
those who may be legally or financially immune from paying anythingcan radically affect the amount by which the plaintiff's eventual judgment is reduced under the Wisconsin formula. Second, it shows how
slight variations in ratio, prompted by the tendency to "round off" numbers of different scales, can actually reverse the legal effect of a judgment.
If the question were to be approached from a standpoint of total
logic, in fact, even causes of an injury which were conceded to be
totally without legal significance-the purely accidental circumstances
which so frequently trigger our modern catastrophies-should be allocated their appropriate causal weight in the proportion, a process which
would dramatically alter the ratios upon which Wisconsin comparative
negligence recoveries are now based. To include such things as the
sting of an errant bee in the proportioning process, regardless of its
"irrelevancy" for purposes of determining legal liability, would often
enlarge the scale of comparison to a point at which the relative
contributions of the human participants would be miniscule indeed.
Fortunately, the cases have not carried the "pure" logic of the matter
to any such lengths.
Pierringerv. Hoger,32 established another, distinctively post-Bielski,
basis upon which a verdict excluding a participant from the proportionment can operate to the prejudice of an included party. All but one
of a number of alleged joint tort-feasors had settled with the plaintiffs,
taking releases which reserved plaintiff's rights against the non-settlor,
but released and satisfied whatever fraction or proportion of the total
liability was attributable to the settling tort-feasors. Plaintiffs then sued
the nonsettling tort-feasor; and, after impleader proceedings had formally joined the settling parties, they sought summary judgment of nonliability. Substantively, it was first determined that the nonsettlor could
have no rights to receive contribution from them, since "they have
bought their peace in any event." There remained the questions whether the undetermined and unsatisfied part of the liability attributable to
the nonsettlor's negligence could be fixed in an action from which the
settling parties had been dismissed; and whether the proportion of causal negligence attributable to the nonsettling tort-feasor could be determined without including in the verdict an express finding as to the
amount of causal fault attributable to the settling tort-feasors, whether
3221 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
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or not they remained formally in the action as parties. After holding
that the dismissals were proper, the court said:
The issue between the plaintiff and the nonsettling defendant
. is the percentage of causal negligence, if any, of the nonsettling defendant, but such percentage of negligence can only be
determined by a proper allocation of all the casual negligence, if
any, of all the joint tort-feasors and of the plaintiff if contributory
negligence is involved . . . the allocation, if any, of the causal

negligence to the settling tort-feasors is merely a part of the
mechanics by which the percentage of
33 causal negligence of the
nonsettling tort-feasor is determined.
To appreciate the sense of this principle, it is necessary to frame the
issue more concretely, in terms of Wisconsin law and practice after
Bielski. To begin with, assume an eventual verdict-award of damages
of $100,000 -to plaintiff A, and assume that A received $35,000 from
the settling tort-feasors. Ignoring possible reduction of damages by
reason of A's contributory negligence, C, the nonsettlor, will be liable
to A for a percentage of $100,000 corresponding to C's proportionate
causal fault, but not ultimately exceeding $65,000. Obviously, at least
two terms are required to fix a proportion. If, then, C's causal negligence, fixed in proportion to all of the negligence causing A's injuries,
is determined at less than 65 percent, the settling tort-feasors have
settled cheaply at the expense of A. If C's causal negligence is fixed at
more than 65 percent, C's excess of liability over the $100,000 maximum
of A's entitlement will redound, either by way of a right of contribution
or by way of a right of subrogation and indemnification, in favor of the
settling tort-feasors. In either event, the impossibility of isolating C's
causal negligence except as a part of a whole is apparent.
INCLUSION OF FACTUALLY IRREVELANT COMPONENTS

IN THE PROPORTION
Whatever occasional degrees of tolerance the Wisconsin court may
have demonstrated for the failure to include all factually relevant conduct in the comparative negligence question of the special verdict, it has
repeatedly insisted that the statutory reduction of a claimant's verdict
damages may not be determined by any process of proportional factoring-out of legally and factually irrelevant conduct, which the jury has
been permitted to include in the formula. The rationale of Pattersonv.
Edgerton Sand & Gravel Co., 34-- that the omission of one or more persons from the inquiry is harmless to a defendant because the jury
would "presumably" have adhered to "the same ratio," as between the
parties actually inquired about, if omitted party had been included in
the inquiry-apparently does not work in reverse.
33 Id.

at 191, 124 N.W.2d at 111.

34 227 Wis. 11, 227 N.W. 636 (1938).
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Thus, in Callan v. Wick,3 5 the Jury returned a verdict ascribing 10
percent of the negligence causing the plaintiff's injuries to the plaintiff,
80 percent to the host-driver, and 10 percent to the third-party driver.
When the trial court erroneously ruled that the finding of causal negligence against the plaintiff was contrary to law and the evidence and
ordered judgment against the host's insurer and the third party for the
full amount of damages returned under the verdict, the host's insurer
and the third party appealed. The supreme court saw fit to agree neither
with the jury nor with the trial court. It ruled that the finding of causal
negligence against the plaintiff could not be set aside as a matter of law,
but that the finding against the third party appellant was totally unsupported in the evidence, and ordered dismissal of the claim against him
on the merits. This left for decision the question whether plaintiff
should recover either 88.89 percent or 90 percent of his verdict-damages
from the host-driver; or whether the comparison, having been adulterated by inclusion of an improper factor, was invalid and required new
trial.
If the improperly included 10 percent had been "factored-out"
according to "the same ratio" established in the verdict, it is obvious
that the plaintiff's verdict-damage should have been reduced by 11.11
percent (one-ninth). It is equally obvious that no jury would be likely
to return so abstruse a percentage against the plaintiff. The court
stoutly insisted:
Under Sec. 331.045, Stats, when a comparison of negligence
is made and the same is expressed in percentages, the total aggregate must always equal 100 percent . . . (A) new comparison
must be had between the plaintiff. . . and the defendant.3 6

Another reported instance of the same judicial reluctance to presume
that an apportionment of negligence including an improper factor establishes a valid ratio between the other factors was Vroman v.
Krempke.37 Two passengers, the host's wife and daughter, sought to
recover from the host for their respective injuries. The verdict-form
required the jury, if the passengers were found contributorily negligent,
to proportion their negligence with that of the host in a single, three-part
proportion, totalling 100 percent. The jury dutifully returned 25 percent against each of the passengers and 50 percent against the host. The
trial court ordered judgment against the host for 75 percent of the respective verdict-damages.
The source of the problem, obviously, was that the negligence of
each passenger operated as a cause only of that passenger's injury; and,
having no tendency to cause the accident itself, was in no sense relevant
to the other passenger's damages. Describing the trial court's interpre35 269 Wis. 68, 68 N.W.2d 438 (1955).
36 Id. at 74, 68 N.W.2d at 441.
-3 34 Wis. 2d 680, 150 N.W.2d 423 (1967).
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tation of the verdict as "speculation," and saying that a one-third, twothirds proportion (the true ratio) "can as reasonably be argued," the
court remanded both cases for retrial on the issues of negligence and
causation.
The net result of the Callan and Vroman decisions should not be
permitted to pass unnoticed. It may be confidently assumed that, if
the cases were retried as the court's mandate directed, the proportions
of causal negligence established in the second verdicts would not correspond with those established originally, though the lack of correspondence would excite no legal or judicial concern whatever. The first
proportions having been declared void by judicial fiat, essentially because they were determined upon an overbroad scale, they simply drop
out of existence in legal contemplation.
In mathematical contemplation, however, no mere change in the
size of scale can affect a validly established proportion as between two
proper factors. If factors A, B, and C are compared and proportioned
with one another, and C is thereafter determined to have been an irrelevant factor in determining the relationship of A to B, the reduction of
scale which results from the exclusion of C will necessarily affect the
numerical values assigned to A and B on the original scale; but such
exclusion will have no effect upon the relative values of A and B, i.e., the
ratio between them. Thus, in Vroman, the original verdict established
a precise ratio of 1 to 2 between the causal negligences of each plaintiff
and the defendant, casting this ratio on a scale which included an improper and irrelevant factor of 25 percent with respect to each plaintiff.
To revalue this ratio on a consistent 100 percent scale confined to the
relevant factors requires, in mathematical terms, only that the ratio of
25 to 50, or 1 to 2, be revalued upon the proportion of 75 to 100, by
the formula 25:75 as X:100. By mathematical solution, the new value
of the negligence of each plaintiff is 33 1/3 percent. It is not mathematically possible for a second jury, charged with a redetermination of
the proportion, to return any other comparison than 1 to 2 without
performing a fundamental reappraisal of the relative weights of the
factors, ostensibly in the merely mechanical process of assigning corrected scale-values to those factors.
Is this to say that there is no logical basis for requiring redetermination, where a foreign factor has been permitted to intrude itself? If
one clearly recognizes the essentially analogous nature of the mathematical proportioning demanded by Wisconsin's comparative negligence
law and procedure, he also recognizes that the objective rigidities of
mathematical laws can-and often do-lead to confusion, deception,
and error when applied to qualitative judgments. It may be claimed
with some logic, therefore, that even the ratio fixed upon an overbroad
(or underbroad) scale is unreliable and deceptive in its apparent mathe-
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matical precision, in much the same sense that computation of pain and
suffering awards, in jury argument, by unit-of-time multiplication was
criticized in Affett v. Milwaukee & S. T. Corp.38 In rejecting the conclusion of the much cited Rattner v. Arrington," the court described
the problem of reduction of scales as ultimately productive of "absurdity."
If a day may be used as a unit of time in measuring pain and
suffering, there is no logical reason why an hour or a minute or
a second could not be used, or perhaps even a heartbeat, since we
live from heartbeat to heartbeat. If one cent were used for each
second of pain, this would amount to $3.60 per hour, to $86.40
per twenty-four-hour day, and to $31,536 per year. The absurdity
of such a result must40be apparent, yet a penny a second might not
sound unreasonable.

INTERNAL CONTRADICTION IN A SINGLE VERDICT

While, therefore, it may be a feasible and defensible practice to reject and annul the ratios established upon underbroad or overbroad
scales, and to ignore the predictable inconsistencies which will develop
upon a second trial, the process of retrial is hardly the ideal solution
to the necessity of disposing of as many claims as possible in a single
and internally consistent verdict. Unfortunately, that necessity involves
several vexing problems of its own, upon which the cases have been
only mildly helpful at best, and downright confusing at worst.
McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.41 translated the con-

ventional assumption of risk defense, especially as applicable to guestpassengers, into terms of contributory negligence under Wisconsin's
comparative negligence doctrine. As a result, a large category of new
"causal negligences" was born and required accommodation in the
comparison-formula of the special verdict. The new class was particularly problem-provoking, however, because it consisted mainly of "passive" conduct of the passenger in consenting unreasonably to ride with
a negligent driver-conduct which may well have "caused" the passenger's personal injuries, but, of itself, does not operate to cause the colli42
sion, or the resultant damages of anyone else. Vroman v. Kempke,
(which postdated McConville), involved the inclusion of two such "passive" negligence factors in one comparison; but essentially the same
problem is presented whenever a "passive" factor is included in a comparison with "active" factors, and the case involves more than the single
claim for personal injury damages of the "passively" negligent party.
As to the other claims, the "passive" negligence is an irrelevant factor,
which must be excised in some fashion in order to produce an acceptaWis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959).
4OAffett v. Milwaukee & S.T. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d at 613-14, 106 N.W.2d at 280
(1960).
41 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
42 34 Wis. 2d 680, 150 N.W.2d 423 (1967).
3811
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ble set of ratios and values upon which those other claims may be
adjudicated.
To place the matter in entirely proper perspective, it should be noted
that McConville accentuated, but did not entirely originate, the problem
of utilizing a single verdict-comparison for disposition of multiple claims
where one of those claims involves "passive" negligence. In a comment,
Collateral Estoppel in Negligence Actions, 43 student editor Adrian
Schoone isolated the problem of what he named "unidirectional" negligence, illustrated by the somewhat common habit of extending an arm
or elbow outside of a moving vehicle. More recently, seat belt installa44
tions have given rise to another kind of "passive" negligence defense.
These suggest cases in which "passive" negligence may exist without
any necessary reference either to passengers or to the abolition of assumption of risk as a specific defense.
The McConville opinion recognized that its basic rule would:
Require care and attention in framing a verdict under some
situations... If there were claims of one driver against the other
for damages, it would be necessary to have more than one comparison question. The guest's negligence with respect to riding
with the host would affect the guest's right to recover from the
host or other driver or both, and would enter into the comparison
of the guest's causal negligence with that of each driver but would
be immaterial with respect to the right of one driver to recover
from the other. 45 (Emphasis supplied).
However, justice Thomas E. Fairchild, who wrote the McConville
opinion, appeared to have second thoughts about the matter. Only a
few months later, he prepared a paper on Recent Developments in the
Area of Torts, in which he stated:
After McConville, the jury will not be asked whether Guest
assumed the risk, but whether she was negligent and whether her
negligence caused her injuries. If the only issue as to Guest's
negligence is whether she was negligent in riding with Host, the
problem is not difficult. Assume 20 percent of all the negligence
causing her injuries is attributed to her, 45 percent to Host and
35 percent to Other Driver. Guest recovers 80 percent of her
damages from Host and Other Driver, jointly and severally. But
only 80 percent of the found negligence caused the collision and
the injuries to Host and Other Driver. Should not Other Driver
be given judgment against Host for 45/80 of Other Driver's
damages? He will be awarded contribution of any amount he
pays Guest in excess of 35/80 of her recovery.
It has also been suggested that it may not be necessary to
include more than one comparison question in a verdict, even
1341 MARQ. L. REv. 456 (1957).
44See Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W2d 626 (1967); Symposium:
The Seat Belt Defense In Practice, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 155 (1970).
45 15 Wis. 2d at 385, 113 N.W.2d at 20.
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where a guest's "active" negligence be claimed. It has been suggested that a verdict might be so framed as to call for separate
findings on a guest's negligence with respect to riding with the
host and her negligence in some other respect, causing the collision, and to include but one comparison question, which would
nevertheless be a basis for a proper judgment.
Assume that in answer to the comparison question, tl~e jury
attributes 10 percent of all the negligence causing Guest's injuries
to Guest's negligence with respect to riding with Host, 15 percent
to Guest's negligence with respect to interfering with Host's
proper lookout, 45 percent to Host's negligence, and 30 percent
to Other Driver's negligence. Guest will be given judgment for
75 percent of her damages. Should not Other Driver have judgment against Host for 30/90 of his damages? The denominator
90 is the total of Guest's active negligence (15) plus Host's
negligence (45) plus Other Driver's negligence (30). A single
comparison question will reduce claims of inconsistency between
answers. Won't the single comparison question, so framed, be
adequate in most cases, notwithstanding the reference in McConville to "more than one comparison question ?"46
In the following year, the Wisconsin court adverted, somewhat
hypothetically and by way of dicta, to the Fairchild proposals:
When there is an issue between a host-driver and another
driver concerning the injuries or property damage to either or
both of them, separate comparison questions may not be necessary as suggested in McConville. A recent law review article
points out that one apportionment question might still be used
as basis for the two comparisons and the avoidance of a possible
inconsistent verdict. In such a case the inquiries relating to the
cause questions of negligence of the host and other driver could
be stated in terms of causing the collision and also, if it is in the
case, the question of the guest's active negligence. The question
concerning the guest's passive negligence would be stated only in
terms of causing his own injuries and not also of causing the
collision. The apportionment question would include all the negligence which caused the collision or the injuries. In such a
comparison, the guest's right of recovery would be determined
as in an ordinary case by considering the guest's total negligence
in reducing the amount of his recovery. The issue between the
host and the other driver for their respective damages would be
determined by considering only the negligence causing the collision, and the percentages of negligence found in the verdict
would be converted by the court into proportional fractions of
that negligence for that purpose. The same result could be
reached by stating all the causal questions in terms of causing
injuries to the plaintiff. Since the negligence of the host and the
other driver and the active negligence of the plaintiff, if any,
causing the plaintiff's injuries would necessarily be a cause of
the collision, the same basis of causal negligence attributable to
the damages suffered by the host or the other driver would be
4646 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 9 (1962).
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determined. The court by a simple process of fractions could
determine the right and
the amount of recovery between them.
47
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is difficult to regard this suggested process of court-performed
proportioning as constituting anything other than the same scaling
down of an overboard verdict, so as to "factor-out" irrelevancy, which
the court had so persistently condemned before; and, in fact, condemned
thereafter in both the Vroman4" and Dutcher49 cases. A plainer case
of a court trapped in the illogic of its own logic can scarcely be imagined.
The essence of the problem which produced this judicial confusion
and self-contradiction lies in the near impossibility of avoiding internal
inconsistency of ratio in a verdict which adopts the "two-comparison"
approach suggested in McConville. If, for example, a jury returns 20
percent "passive" causal negligence against a passenger-guest, 45 percent "active" negligence against the host, and 35 percent against the
other driver, a ratio of 45 to 35 (or 9 to 7) has been established between host and other driver. justice Fairchild, apparently seconded
by the Theisen case, would now determine the other driver's judgment
against the host, factoring out the irrelevant 20 percent of passive negligence, under the formula 35:80 = X:100, producing a mathematical
formula reduction of other driver's verdict damages of 43.75 percent.
But his McConville procedure would submit to the jury, in the same
verdict, a separate comparison of active negligences between host and
third party. Any allocation other than 43.75 percent to other driver and
56.25 percent to host would be contradictory of the first ratio, and the
contradiction (almost certain to occur) would appear on the face of a
single verdict.
Is there, then, no escape from the dilemma of contradiction? Must
we either accept the suspect process of mathematical factoring-out, or
learn to abide an inevitable series of self-contradictory verdicts? I submit that there is one possibility, not altogether "pure" or perfect," but
supported in all of its aspects by some semblance of judicial and mathematical precedent. The key to the puzzle is simply to factor the passive
negligence into a pre-established ratio of the active negligence, rather
than attempting to factor it out of an established mixed ratio.
Thus, assume the case as before, where there is evidence under
which the cross-complaining host and other driver may both be found
negligently to have caused the collision, and passenger-plaintiff to have
been causally negligent for his own safety, with respect to riding with
host, wearing a seat belt, or otherwise. After appropriate preliminary
form instructions directing the jurors to answer only if they have esTheisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 2d at 107, 118 N.W.2d
at 147 (1962).
48 34 Wis. 2d 680, 150 N.W.2d 423 (1967).
49 Dutcher v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 37 Wis. 2d 591, 155 N.W.2d 609 (1968).
47
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tablished causal negligence requiring comparison under their answers
to prior special verdict questions, they could be asked to compare, on a
100 percent scale, the negligences which operated to cause the collision.
Next, and after a further preliminary direction, the verdict might require the jury to proportion the passive negligence of the plaintiff out of
the total causal negligence contributing (actively or passively) to the
plaintiff's injury. To avoid the necessity of restating (reproportioning)
the active negligences, the question could be so confined as to require
that the jury answer only as to the percentage of an assumed total at
which they appraise the passive negligence.
In formula, if the relevant active negligences were designated a,
b, and c, and the passive negligence of a claimant were designated p,
then a plus b plus c plus p would constitute 100 percent of the negligence causing the personal injuries of the passively negligent claimant;
and a plus b plus c would constitute 100 percent of the negligences
causing the collision (and the damages of cross-claimants). The values
of a, b, and c would be first fixed in their proper proportions as causes
of the collision. Then the value of p would be determined under a
formula inquiring: p is what percent of the total of a plus b plus c plus

p ?"
If, then, the values assigned in the first proportion to a, b, and c
were 25 percent, 35 percent, and 40 percent, respectively, and the value
assigned to p in the second proportion were 15 percent, all of the valuefactors necessary to dete'rmine the appropriate verdict-reductions as to
all claimants would be provided. The passively negligent claimant, obviously, would recover 85 percent of his verdict damages; and the ratio
of joint tort-feasor contribution to that claimant's judgment, between
themselves, would be 25:35:40. The same ratio would control the disposition of cross-complaints between the joint tort-feasors, and the
liabilities of actors b and c to contribute, between themselves, to the
damages of actor a.
The utility of this approach is not weakened in any way if it happens that a claimant is found to have been both actively and passively
negligent in producing his own injuries-a problem which struck Justice Fairchild as one of special complexity in his law review paper.
The complexity is handled simply by including the active negligence
of the claimant as one of the factors in that proportion, and isolating
the passive negligence precisely as above suggested.
A slight problem is created, in such cases, by the necessity of adjusting the figures returned in response to the active negligence proportion
in order to reflect the necessary inclusion of the claimant's passive negligence, restoring the formula a plus b plus c plus p equals 100 percent
where both a and p must be combined to produce the proper reduction
of the claimant's verdict damages. The solution, however, is not inordi-
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nately difficult. If the verdict values a at 25 percent, b at 35 percent, and
c at 40 percent of the total negligent causes of the claimant's injuries,
it is necessary to scale down the a, b, and c values to accommodate the
inclusion of 15 percent in the formula. The corrected values, computed
by the court, are 21.7 5(a), 29.25(b), and 34.00(c). In this example,
claimant has lost his right to recover for personal injuries at all, since
the aggregate of his active and passive negligences exceeds the amount
attributable to either of the other two parties on a single, all-inclusive
scale.

Thus, the results of the process may sometimes be a bit startling.
To cite another illustration, suppose a simple two-party action in which
a car driven by A collides with one driven by B, damaging both cars
and injuring both drivers, and producing a claim and counterclaim.
Assume that the active negligences are apportioned 45 percent to A
and 55 percent to B. Now assume that A is found to have aggravated
his own injuries by failing to fasten his seat belt, and that this negligence is found to represent 10 percent of the total causes of A's personal
injury. B having been found to have contributed more than half of
the causes of his own injuries and damages, he is foreclosed of recovery.
By the same token, A recovers his auto damages reduced by 45 percent.
But the recalculated proportion with respect to A's personal injuries
places the values at 49.5 percent against B and 50.5 percent (40.5 percent plus 10 percent) against A-foreclosing A from recovering for
his personal injuries in a collision which was, itself, more the fault of
B than of A.
SOME CONCLUSORY OBSERVATIONS

In his dissent in Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co.,50 supra, Chief Justice
Hallows of the Wisconsin Supreme Court offered a compelling argument for the proposition that, in all logic and justice, Wisconsin should
immediately adopt by judicial decree the doctrine of "pure" comparative
negligence. His brethren differed unanimously on only one point:
whether, by reason of prudent abstention or lack of power, the court
should defer to a pending legislative study of the matter.
In order procedurally to accommodate his proposal, the Chief Justice urged a number of other changes. He would also adopt a version
of the remittitur-additur principle, as modified in Powers v. Allstate
Ins. Co. 51 to include judicial reapportionment of negligence. He also
urges that:
...juries should be instructed on the effect of their apportionment of negligence and that their verdict is subject to the control
of the court. Juries should know what they are doing and not be
allowed to determine a verdict on their false assumptions.-2
50
Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d at 131, 177 N.W.2d at 518.
5110 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393 (1960).
52 47 Wis. 2d at 139, 177 N.W.2d at 522.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

At an earlier place, the Chief Justice responds to the critics of the
"pure" comparative negligence doctrine by alleging that their arguments
,(evince a curious lack of confidence in the jury system."53 This, perhaps,
touches upon the critical question to be considered in the disposition of
the entire set of questions to which this paper has been addressed.
Anglo-American trial procedure has not always required that juries
confine their attention to "the evidence given in court and the law
according to the instructions of the court"; and, in fact, there are vast
segments of modern American trial practice in which juries, realistically
speaking, may give their verdicts with relative impunity upon whatever
set of standards they see fit to adopt. If the process of jury instruction,
among several dozen other devices for court control of jury "lawlessness," does not evince a certain "lack of confidence in the jury system,"
then certainly Wisconsin's special verdict procedure (only recently reformed from the impending chaos of its former absurd length and technicality) indicates a strong suspicion that jurors may not, in fact, find
it possible to comprehend all of the marvelous complexities of law, and
to incorporate them accurately and faithfully into a consistent verdict.
What other reason or excuse exists for the requirement that jurors
report not merely their ultimate award, but each "ultimately factual"
component necessary to arrive at such an award, after a thorough inspection of the propriety of the verdict-answers by the court?
Is it not simple prudence, however, to assume that unlearned jurors
will confuse and mistake the working of ratios and proportions which
have managed somehow to confuse almost two generations of distinguished lawyers and judges? The rules of Bielski and McConville are
nearly ten years old, and we have yet to settle so ostensibly "easy" a
question as the matter of moving from one scale of comparison to another-a question which has perched naggingly on the shoulder of comparative negligence theory from its earliest adoption, but which we
have managed somehow never to answer.
Comparative negligence theory, in the last analysis, is precisely as
logical, and as productive of justice, as the validity of its comparisons
permits it to be. So far as the critical decision of liability rests on a
basic determination that the causal negligence of one actor is simply
greater or less that that of another, the comparison is essentially valid
and reliable; but when basic liability depends only on the more speculative and undefined assertion that the causal negligence of an actor
constituted a specific percentage of the total causes of an injury, that
finding is often so unencumbered by objective proofs and disproofs as
to be largely arbitrary, speculative, and unreliable.
This basic fact is not controverted by a repetitious insistence that
every tort-feasor ought, in reason and justice, to pay "his just propor5
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tionate share" of the damages which he has caused, whether to himself
or to others. Of course, he should! But that is sheer question-begging,
because it assumes the basic fact that "his just proportionate share" has
been objectively ascertained pursuant to some sensible and defined
standard of valuation and comparison.
When a jury is commanded, without benefit of rational definition
or standard, to produce precise numerical ratios which, when applied in
several sophisticated combinations to the several claims and crossclaims of perhaps half a dozen litigants, will justly compensate each of
them in dollar amounts according to a single, internally consistent formula, it is a profound understatement-and it does not evince a curious
lack of confidence in the jury system-to assume that the resultant
verdict-proportions may be something less than totally valid.
Something is apparently wrong with the justice of a verdict such
as that illustrated at the close of the last section of this paper, where
neither claimant is permitted to recover anything for his personal injuries, but one may recover 55 percent of his auto damages. But what
is wrong? Is it the "equal to or less than" rule, as the Chief Justice
insists, 54 or may it be the numbers themselves?
Simply in order to illustrate the possibility that shocking and anomalous results can arise even from "pure" comparison, and even assuming the total accuracy of the numerical ratio, let us reexamine the same
case there suggested (A 45 percent, B 55 percent actively negligent, A
10 percent passively negligent) under "pure" theory. Of course, we
must now make some additional assumptions about the "recoverable
damages" of the respective parties, the presence or absence of liability
insurance, and perhaps about the extent to which one party or the other
has passed his damages onto a "collateral source."
Therefore, let us assume that A is a laborer, and B a corporate executive. A's car damage is worth $500, his loss of earnings for six
months $5,000, and his medical expenses amount to $1,000. He has
no liability insurance, and no "collateral sources" have picked up any
of his losses. Assume a pain and suffering factor of $5,000.
B's auto damage is $3,000, his loss of earnings for six months is
$50,000, and his medical expenses are billed to his hospital-surgical insurer at $15,000. Ignoring the subrogation claim of his collision carrier,
all of the "losses" are compensated by collateral sources, and B is
insured against liability. Assume, evenhandedly, a pain and suffering
factor of $5,000.
In terms of comparative fault, and in terms of the basic kind and
nature of damages directly sustained by A and B in the collision, this
case is rather closely balanced. Each driver lost his car, each lost six
months of work and each "suffered" to the same extent.
54 Ibid.
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On the Wisconsin formula, A and B would stand their own damages,
ameliorated only by the payment of $275 by B's insurer toward A's
auto repair bill. The accident would have cost A $6,225 in out-of-pocket
loss.
On the "pure comparison" formula, improved "logic and justice"
would operate so as to require B's insurer to pay A, in addition to the
$275, 50.5 percent of his personal injury damages, or $5,555. By the
same token, A would be required to pay B 45 percent of his auto loss
and personal injury damages, amounting to a neat $32,850, subject to
the subrogation rights of B's collision insurer. After appropriate setoff, B would take the $5,830 owed to A by B's insurer; and A could,
if he wished, bankrupt out the deficiency of $27,020, so as to achieve
a net out-of-pocket loss of $6,500 plus the costs of bankruptcy.
As between the two systems, "pure" comparison would cost A a
minimum of $275 plus a bankruptcy, and would profit B somewhere
between $5,830 and $32,850, with the lower amount being borne by
the premium-paying public. Had A been insured, the same public
would have paid B $32,850-a rather handsome compensation to a
driver whose negligence was the major cause of an accident.
The moral is presumably that, as with a comparison of causal negligences, comparative negligence systems can be proportionately evaluated only when all of the relevant factors are taken into account.

